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ABSTRACT
At the phenomenal level, consciousness can be described as a singular, unified field of recursive self-awareness, consistently 
coherent in a particular way; that of a subject located both spatially and temporally in an egocentrically-extended domain, such 
that  conscious  self-awareness  is  explicitly  characterized  by  I-ness,  now-ness  and  here-ness.  The  psychological  mechanism 
underwriting this spatiotemporal self-locatedness and its recursive processing style involves an evolutionary elaboration of the 
basic orientative reference frame which consistently structures ongoing spatiotemporal self-location computations as i-here-now. 
Cognition  computes  action-output  in  the  midst  of  ongoing  movement,  and  consequently  requires  a  constant  self-locating 
spatiotemporal reference frame as basis for these computations. Over time, constant evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency 
have encouraged both the proliferation of anticipative feedforward processing mechansims, and the elaboration, at the apex of 
the sensorimotor  processing  hierarchy,  of  self-activating,  highly attenuated recursively-feedforward  circuitry  processing  the 
basic orientational schema independent of external action output. As the primary reference frame of active waking cognition, 
this recursive i-here-now processing generates a zone of subjective self-awareness in terms of which it feels like something to be 
oneself here and now. This is consciousness. 
1. Introduction: The Mystery of Consciousness   
Isaac Newton spoke for many if not most involved in scientific research regarding the nature of consciousness when he 
lamented to a fellow scientist that "to determine by what modes or actions light produceth in our minds the phantasm of colour 
is not so easie" (circa 1710). Three centuries of further research finds the situation essentially unchanged (Fodor 1992:5; c.f. 
Leibniz 1714; du Bois-Reymond 1874; Mercier 1888; Carpenter 1896; Freud 1940; Magoun 1952; Sutherland 1989; 
Humphrey 2006).1 Consciousness has proved exquisitely elusive in the face of concerted empirical research over centuries, to 
the extent that many today either question its reality (Huxley 1893; Ryle 1949; Wilkes 1995; Dennett 19912), or insist that 
while real, it was never meant to be understood by a human mind shaped by evolution for other tasks (McGinn 1989; 
Humphrey 2006; Pinker 2007); or again, that it simply cannot be understood because of the irreducible and unbridgeable 
divide between subjective and objective domains of knowledge (Nagel 1974; Creutzfelt 1978; Levine 1983; Jackson 1982, 
1986; Searle 1985, 1992; Bisiach 1992; Chalmers 1996; Dietrich & Hardcastle 2004). But, in fact, cognition has available to it 
a highly developed general problem solving capacity–the semantic memory3 system–which already successfully applies 
1 The  history of post­behaviorist re­engagement with the question of consciousness is traced in Shallice (1991).
2
 Are analysts correct in accounting Dennett an eliminativist regarding consciousness (Shallice 1992; Van  Gulick 1992; Block 
1992; Aronson  et al 1992; Anthony 1992; Glymour et al 1992; Mangan  1993; Revonsuo  1993; Seager 1999)? Dennett 
emphatically  denies he is a behaviorist for who m  ‘everything except human  behavior is a fiction’(1991 Appendix A). Indeed 
the book’s 511  pages  are devoted to a serious consideration of cognitive processes in general and  consciousness in particular. 
Terminology like ‘ our  conscious states’, ‘self­conscious thinking’, ‘stream  of consciousness’ and  ‘conscious in the fullest 
sense’ recurs continuously (17, 21, 29, 124, 132, 136, 180, 212, 225, 259, 264, 275, 281, 445). But this is merely philosophical 
sleight of hand, for in fact, Dennett never ceases his insistance that ‘there is no reality of conscious experience’ (132), only a 
seeming to be self­aware that is just a ‘ m a gnificent fiction’ (366, 429), an intellectual error involving the 
misidentification of what has actually taken place cognitively (134), which is in reality a series of unconscious perceptual 
‘content­fixations’ (113) dubbed  ‘ m ultiple drafts’ (111ff, 431), accompanied by a smorgasbord of additional cognitive 
operations (attentional probing 135­6); propositional attitudes about the content fixations (128, 132, 317, 364); the running of 
me mes  on (210) or metacognitive self­monitoring (311) on a Von  Neumannesque  simulation machine—there is no attempt 
whatsoever to synthesize a single coherent recipe of consciousness in the book). This combination of successive drafts along 
with a second  operation of one  kind or another can generate the false sense, claims Dennett, that one  seems  to be subjectively 
self­aware, where in fact one  is not (134), it is all an illusion (311). For Dennett, as for his 1950’s behaviorist mentors Quine and  
Ryle, there is no subjective phenomenology (365): no qualia, no self and  no consciousness as actual direct subjective self 
awareness. Consciousness has indeed been  explained away. 
3 Experiments conducted in the 1970s by the Canadian psychologist Endel Tulving and  his associate Daniel Schacter proved 
that "intension" (such as concepts) and  "extension" (such as episodes) are dealt with by two different types of me m ory: 
episodic me m ory  contains specific episodes of the history of the individual, while semantic me mory  contains general 
knowledge  (both concepts and  facts) applicable to different situations. Episodic me m ory, which receives and  stores information 
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objective anaytical methods to ‘subjective’ phenomena as the study of physical self-sustaining dissipative systems (Prigogine 
1955; Bickhard 2004, 2008), and as the study of biological organisms which are homeostatically self-regulating (Bernard 
1859; Cannon 1932), somatically self-maintaining (Maturana & Varela 1973), self-representing (Churchland 2002ab), and in 
the case of the immune system self-recognizing (Tsutsui 2004). Manifestly, there is no a priori basis for the assertion that 
cognitive subjectivity is in principle intellectually impregnable, particularly in regard to empirical analysis and description.
The seemingly intractable mystery of consciousness has a simpler, more immediate explanation, rooted in the incompleteness 
of current neuropsychological theory. The problem of explaining the properties of phenomenal experience in psychological 
(and ultimately biophysical) terms finds a parallel, as Antii Revonsuo suggests (2005:287-291), in the conundrum encountered 
by science a century ago, when attempting to explain the relation of chemistry to physics and biology to chemistry. In both 
instances, the discontinuity between properties dissolved as scientists understood each level of organization with more 
precision – the role of electrons in atomic physics sufficient to explain chemical binding, and the role of macromolecules and 
complex biochemical feedback pathways sufficient to explain biological activity. 
Similarly, the apparent discontinuity between the phenomenal properties of consciousness and empirically-demonstrated 
psychoneurological processes is most likely to derive from an incomplete understanding of cognitive processing mechanisms 
on the one hand (Medwar 1967; Horgan 1999; Churchland 2002a:157, 170), alongside an insufficiently-precise analysis of the 
phenomenal properties of consciousness on the other. Accordingly, the explication of consciousness as recursive self-location 
will align the core phenomenal characteristics of consciousness (consistent self-awareness as subject located here and now) 
with a specific cognitive construct (self-locational schema) processed in a particular recursively feedforward manner.  
2. Phenomenal Properties of Consciousness    
Conscious cognitive processing is consistently coherent in certain distinctive ways. Significant psychological features include 
its cyclical activation over the sleep/wake cycle, distal representational format, limited processing capacity, seriality and close 
association with short term memory, attention, and the detection of novelty. However, vociferous debate as to the critical 
qualities of consciousness has established a consensual recognition that no explanation of consciousness can be considered 
complete without addressing a specific set of core phenomenal properties (Chalmers 1995, 1996; Levine 1983; Nagel 1974; 
Block 1995).4 Unity, recursive processing style and egocentric perspective are among the features most frequently cited as 
basic phenomenal characteristics of consciousness (for summaries of phenomenal properties see Searle 1992; Metzinger 1995; 
de Sousa 2002; Revonsuo 2005;  Delacour 1995, 1997; Weisberg 2005). A fourth essential phenomenal ingredient of 
conscious self-awareness, the self, calls attention to the fact that the (egocentric) first-person perspective is not expressed in 
the abstract–as merely an egocentric point of view–but is represented in concrete spatiotemporal terms as a distinctly-
perceived self, which is not merely oriented spatially and temporally from the first-person perspective, but orientationaly 
situated – as an “I” situated “here” and “now” (de Sousa 2002:150; Nagel 1986:61; Metzinger 1995:16; Revonsuo 2005:133). 
At the level of phenomenal experience, this spatiotemporally situated i-here-now flows continuously forward through 
successive events as a singular, ongoing event-moment, a unified “stream of consciousness” (James 1890) characterised 
primarily by its indivisableness (Descartes 1641; Kant 1781/7; Bretano 1874) and its explicitly autoreferential, recursive or 
subjective style of cognitive processing (Searle 1992). 
Subjectivity, the distinctly recursive, referring-back-upon-itself processing regime which manifests phenomenaly as subjective 
self-awareness, constitutes the central defining characteristic of consciousness for an ever-increasing quorum of analysts 
(Wundt, 1896; Pieron, 1951; Nagel 1974; Weimer, 1976; Ey, 1978; Searle 1980, 1992; McGinn, 1983; Lycan 1987; 
about temporally­dated episodes and spatiotemporal relations among  them, is a faithful record of a person's experience. 
Semantic me mory, instead, is organized knowledge  about the world (Schacter &  Tulving 1994).
4 This lack of focus on the phenomenal characteristics of consciousness is nicely illustrated in a recent paper (Seth, Baars &  
Edelman  2004) reviewing 18 ‘ widely recognized properties of consciousness’, only three of which are phenomenal, and five of 
which (reportability, allocentricity, limited capacity &  seriality, and thalamocortical processing, widespread brain activity associated 
with content) are decidedly not characteristics of consciousness as such at all. 
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Jackendoff, 1987; Kunzendorf, 1988; Schacter 1989; Strehler; 1991, Gallup, 1991; Edelman, 1992; Damasio, 1992; 
McLaughlin, 1992; Sommerhoff & MacDorman, 1994; Picton & Stuss, 1994; Harth 1995; Levine 1995, 2001; Bogen, 1995; 
Flohr 1995; Metzinger 1995; Chalmers 1995; Deikman, 1996; Carruthers 2000, Greenfield 2000; Mandik, 2001; Rosenthal 
2002; Koch 2004; Sieb 2004; Dietrich & Hardcastle 2004; Legrand 2007). Accounting for this recursive, autonoetic capacity in 
terms of a credible cognitive mechanism constitutes, arguably, the major challenge for any theory of consciousness. Subjectivity, 
in its turn, underwrites “raw feels” or qualia, the capacity to experience inner feelings (love, hope, fear), thoughts (plans, 
opinions) and unadorned sensory feels like the redness of a ripe tomato, the smell of gasoline or the discomfort of a pebble in 
the shoe (Block 2007:22).
In the following proposal, this complex of phenomenal properties will be accounted for in terms of a tonically-activated 
spatiotemporal event schema configuring the continuous self-to-environment interaction as a single ongoing event, the 
structural parameters of which are causal, spatial and temporal. Expressed in the egocentric terms of a first-person perspective 
necessary for action control, these structural parameters consist of a tonic I-ness, here-ness and now-ness. The architecture 
within which this egocentric event schema is continuously processed, involves feedback processing necessary to relate action 
output to homeostatic needs. This processing mechanism will be seen to have developed into a highly-attenuated recursive 
feedforward circuit as a result of evolutionary pressures for energy-saving forms of processing (Diagram 3 items ‘b’ and ‘c’). 
The tonic recursive processing of the i-here-now interactive event schema underwrites subjective self-awareness such that it 
feels like something to be oneself here and now. 
3. Cognitive Elements Comprising the Content of Consciousness 
Cognition represents  With or without nervous systems, almost all living organisms have found a way of responding 
adaptively to environmental changes through movement. Photosynthetic organisms such as plants maximize their ability to 
harvest light by actively orienting stem and leaves toward the sun. Subcellular microtubules, as a consequence of changes in 
electric polarization which induces movement, are able to position themselves and shift positions so as to move about within 
the cell. Single-celled eukaryotes such as amoeba and paramecium achieve motility using hairlike flagella activated by a chain 
of molecular sensors.
Electrotonically-based nervous systems, on the other hand, provide several advantages over molecular chains: (1), a capacity 
for spontaneous endogenous activation (Passano 1963); (2), faster signal propagation (Pumphrey & Young 1938; Mackie 
1970); (3), signal amplification through spike propagation (Mackie 1990:911); (4), more selective activation based on sensory 
pattern recognition (Mackie 1990:908), and (5), a capacity to coordinate the action of multiple effectors, underwriting a 
capacity for more complex movements through multiple dendrites and axon corollaries (Parker 1946; Passano 1963; Pantin 
1965; Horridge 1968; Mackie 1970).  But arguably the biggest advantage is that nervous systems can represent, they can 
generate mediating informational states (Markman & Dietrich 1998) that carry & display information about something other 
than itself – information about the external environment and internal bodily homeostasis.5 Representation remains a somewhat 
controversial issue (reviews include Gallistel 2006; Markman & Dietrich 2000; Haselager & de Groot 2003). However, it is 
difficult if not impossible to adequately account for a host of cognitive functions without some notion of representation, 
particularly in the case of  hallucination, and dreaming where there is no external input at all (Revonsuo 2001; Ullman 1980). 
If cognition operates in terms of representations, what, precisely, do representations represent? Is the representational system a kind 
of Triesman Machine, involved primarily in the manipulation of cobbled-together surface features of objects (Triesman 1996, 
1998); or by contrast, is it designed to operate in terms of a portrayal of dynamic action events (Neisser 1975; Zacks & Tversky 
2001). If the latter, is representation configured at base in terms of the singular ongoing dynamic self-movement event involving 
the organism as it interacts continuously with its environment? The evidence indicates that cognition is designed first and foremost 
5  The  physics of representation understood as some  sort of a mediating cognitive state, remains a mystery. And  as long as the 
relationship between  the underlying physical processes and symbolic (representational) properties remains obscure, the notion of 
mental representation cannot be accepted as (does not constitute) an explanatory primitive – see final section of this proposal below  
(Implications and Final Consderations).
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to manage the ongoing dynamic agent-to-environment interactional event. Moreover, it is designed to manage self-movement in 
relation to the environment as an actively self-moving platform. This fact is critical, because it determines the format in which 
interaction is represented and managed, and the structural parameters of that format will constitute the essential content of 
consciousness.
Cognition represents ongoing mobile interaction of the self-moving agent with the environment  Evidence suggests that 
cognition provides biological organisms with the means to extend homeostatic self-regulation through the provision of a self-
movement capacity (see 4. The Architecture of Consciousness below). This means that cognitive systems are self-movement 
systems, designed to operate while moving, to represent in terms of interaction while on the hoof as it were (Clark 1997), as a 
moving platform (Merker 2005). Within the embodied cognition and dynamical systems literature, the understanding that 
cognition manages interaction and does so while mobile is referred to as situated activity (Wilson 2002:626). This designed-
for-motility or situated character of cognition underwrites the design of cognitive processing in several critical dimensions. 
From the perspective of Evolutionary Psychology, perceptual systems first emerge to detect the self-movement of the agent 
through the environment (Milner & Goodale 1998), and virtually all perceptual channels anticipatively adjust their output for 
this ongoing self-movement through the environment in order to maintain the stability of the egocentric perceptual display6 
(Held 1965; Merker 2005:90; Bell 1989; Towel & Hartmann 2006; Blazquez, Hirata & Highstein 2004; Bridgeman, van der 
Heijdan & Velichkovsky 1994; VanDoorn et al 2005). Moreover, object recognition requires interactive self-movement both 
to develop properly (Held & Hein 1963), and to function optimally when developed (Schrater, Knill & Simoncelli 2001; 
Gibson 1947, 1950, 1957; Gibson, Gibson, Smith & Flock 1959; Horridge 1987; Collett 2002; Jokisch & Troje 2003).  
Indeed the entire perceptual process is configured in terms of motile agent-to-environment interaction. Studies show that 
entities are first perceptually “individuated” as locus-of-movement (Raftopoulos 2004; Carey & Xu 2001; Spelke 1990), and 
then initially identified through categorization in terms of kinds of movement (Heider & Simmel 1944; Csibra et al 1999). 
Ensuing interpretation, in turn, focuses significantly on action potential–how the subject can/should interact with the object, 
what the object offers or affords in terms of the potential-for-action (Gibson 1979; Newton 1996; Cohen 2000:11; Graesser 
1997; Solomon & Barsalou 1997). As a result, the knowledge base drawn upon in this affordance-identification process is 
configured in terms of a privledged interactive “basic level” of categorization (Rosch 1973, 1975, 1999) reflecting the 
distinctive actions we perform on particular classes of objects. Indeed, the entire spatiotemporal manifold in which behavioral 
output is represented as taking place (0000, 0000) is inherently meaningful to the cognitive system only by virtue of bodily 
interaction, the history of self-motion in term of these spatiotemporal parameters. Primitive meaning schemas relating to space 
(up/down, in/out, front/back, left/right, near/far), motility (momentum, source-path-goal, towards/away from), force 
(compulsion, blockage, counterforce, resistance, enablement, attraction), and particularly temporal (then/now) and 
spatiotemporal schemas (fast/slow, change) are all action-oriented and derived from self-movement through the environment 
(Poincaré 1902; Grush 2000; Mandik 2005).
Most significantly, the distal “out there” representational format itself serves the agent-to-environment interactional purpose. 
Perceptual representations reflect neither sensory stimulation nor the excitation patterns in the brain. Rather, events as a whole 
(including objects and agent) are represented as positioned beyond the sense organs (Prinz 1992:6), in a way that satisfies the 
needs of action control (Millikan 1984, 1995; Brunswick 1956; Mandik 2005; Rosenberg & Anderson 2008). And this distal 
format is itself further configured in terms of an interaction-oriented first-person perspective that involves the perspective of 
an agent in relation to the environment in which he is situated. In this sense, cognitive structures configured to facilitate and 
manage agent-to-environment interaction can be said to be “embodied”. They arise from bodily interactions with the world 
(Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Harnad, 1990) and act as “controller of embodied action” (Clark 
1997) or agent-to-environment interaction. 
6 Merker (2005:90) points out that the bodily platform is mobile not only in relatoin to the environment, but also in relation to itself in 
the form of the many  multijointed movements being activated including movement of the exterior sensors themselves within their 
sockets and the head  in relation to the body.
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The fact that sensory individuation, perceptual identification, the memory knowledge base and representational format are all 
configured in interactional terms, indicates not simply that cognition is designed to guide action (Glenberg 1997; Barsalou 
2002; Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak 2004; Borghi 2005), but that the cognitive system is designed to operate under action-
oriented circumstances (ongoing agent-to-environment interaction). The organization of motor output is similarly structured to 
operate in the midst of ongoing mobility. Action output is more or less continuous, commencing immediately upon perceptual 
input, and continuing in successive waves of adjustment and realignment as action proceeds  (Coles et al., 1985; Eriksen, 
Coles, Morris, & O’Hara, 1985; Eriksen & Schultz, 1979; Smid et al., 1990; Neumann, 1990).  Consequent upon this 
commitment to ongoing motility, interactional cognition bears the marks of being time-pressured, of having to function under 
the pressures of real-time interaction (“runtime”) with the environment (Wilson 2002:627; cf.,  Brooks, 1991; Pfeifer & 
Scheier, 1999; van Gelder & Port, 1995). 
Ongoing mobile interaction is represented cognitively as one ongoing interaction managed as self-location The fact that 
cognition is designed to operate as a moving platform, in terms of ongoing interaction, suggests that this process is configured 
cognitively as one singular temporally extended action event. That is to say, ongoing interaction is represented not simply as 
an event, but as the same event with the same representational structure at every successive moment. For purposes of 
management, that structure is configured in terms of  the moment-to-moment spatiotemporal location of the agent in relation 
to the environment. Interaction is managed by the interactor in terms of moment-to-moment self-location. Gallistel points out 
(2006) that direct electrophysiological observation of neural activity has shown that the nervous system represents where the 
animal is and has been within the environment, how it is oriented in terms of both its spatial and temporal relationship to the 
environment. That is to say, the cognitive system manages the ongoing interactional event in terms of a continuously updated 
computation of spatiotemporal self-location. In order to represent self-to-environment interaction, cognition constructs an 
egocentric reference frame (Franklin & Tversky, 1990; Sholl, 1999; Carlson, 1999) which is continuously and automatically 
updated (Farrell 1998; Riecke et al 2007; Wang & Brockmole 2003; van Oostendorp 1994; Blanc & Tapiero, 2001; Riecke & 
von der Heyde, 2002; Bjork, 1978) in relation to ongoing self-movement through the landscape. The reference frame is self-
locating because it is constituted by continuous updating through a combination of external sensory, as well as internal 
proprioceptive and vestibular feedback from self-movement to yield an ongoing sense where and when the organism is in 
relation to the environment (Ventre-Dominey & Vallee 2007; Riecke, Beykirch & Bülthoff 2003, Wirth et al 2007; Wang & 
Brockmole 2003).7  The spatial aspect of self-locational functionality, which is computed on the basis of self-motion cues 
rather than with reference to external visual or acoustic landmarks is referred to as path integration (Bloomberg et al. 1991; 
Glasauer et al. 1994; Israël and Berthoz 1989; Klatzky et al. 1990;  Thomson 1983; Gallistel, 1990; Etienne & Jeffery 2004).8 
The temporal aspect of self-location is referred to as scalar timing (or interval timing), which involves the computing of rate of 
motion and time spent travelling in a certain direction (Eagleman 2005; Alexander, Cowey & Walsh 2005; Berthoz et al 1995; 
Capelli et al 2007; Glausner 2006). Phylogenetically, this spatiotemporal self-locating navigational functionality has been 
identified in crustaceans (Hoffman 1984; Zeil 1998; Layne et al., 2003ab), fish (Moller 2008), insects (Müller & Wehner 1988; 
Etienne et al 1998; Collett & Collett 2000), arachnids (Moller and Görner, 1994; Ortega-Escobar, 2002), reptiles, 9 birds (Saint 
7 These  computations are unconscious, and the results fed to both conscious and unconscious levels of motor control. Different 
insects use different combinations of these spatial and temporal self­motion cues to calculate distance, direction and current position 
(Etienne &  Jeffery 182­3). The  cues are a combination of feedback and anticipative efference copies (Etienne &  Jeffery 184).
8 Also referred to as spatial updating, egocentric updating, and inertial navigation (inertial homing). This 
process was  originally referred to as “dead reckoning”, by analogy with the deduced  (“ded”) reckoning historically used  by 
sailors to navigate across featureless open  sea. First postulated by and  described by Murphy  (1873), in reply to Darwin, as the 
integration of inertial signals, it has more  recently come  to be called “path integration” (Mittelstaedt and  Mittelstaedt, 1980, 
1982) to reflect the assumption that the process takes place by the addition of successive small increments of move ment onto 
a continually updated representation of direction and distance from  the starting point. Ethologists in particular have studied 
“Path Integration” mainly through homing behavior in the context of foraging. This calculation is here denoted “Self­Location” to 
reflect the fact that it also, and  most importantly, computes current location in the environment (Gallistel 1990). 
9 To  date, there have been  no formal studies of path integration specifically in reptiles. However, the formation of an internal 
cognitive map  (Tolman1948) of the environment has been  proven an important part of spatial learning in most species (birds, 
ma m m als, fish, crustaceans) including reptiles (Bennett, 1996; Healy, 1998; Poucet, 1993). More  recently, studies have shown  
that representation of cognitive maps  (and the hippocampal place cells involved in their active representation) are underwritten 
in large measure by ongoing self­move ment, i.e by ongoing self­location in terms of the cognitive map  (Knierim et al., 1998  ; 
Jeffery and  O'Keefe, 1999  ; Sharp et al., 1995  ; Wiener et al., 1995; Mizumori et al 2005; McNaughten  et al, 2006). 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
08
.2
44
4.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
27
 O
ct
 2
00
8
1982; Regolin et al. 1995), and mammals (Mittelstaedt & Mittelstaedt 1980; Etienne et al. 1996; Seguinot, Cattet & Benhamou 
1998; Redish 1999), including humans (Glasauer et al. 1994; Mittelstaedt and Mittelstaedt, 2001). 
Because the cognitive system is designed for constant interactivity, it is designed, ipso facto, to constantly track this ongoing 
interaction. Consequently, egocentric self-locational updating can be considered as constituting the primary ongoing reference 
frame (Hartley & Burgess 2002; Vogeley & Fink 2003; Avraamides & Sofroniou 2006; Briscoe 2008; Kelly, Avraamides & 
Loomis 2007; Wirth et al 2007), and can be accounted, in some sense, the functional heart of the cognitive system. Intelligent, 
cognitively-managed self-movement in relation to the environment is in large measure navigation through the environment based 
on a constant calculation of where and when one is at any given moment (Maguire 1998; Wallentin 2008). And this sense is a 
functional necessity – agents lacking representational knowledge of the where and when of themselves in relation to the 
environment are functionally disabled (Miall & Wolpert 1996: 1267).
The ongoing self-locational event is represented in terms of a single set of egocentric orientational parameters – i-here-now
Tonic spatiotemporal updating maintains an egocentric action-event representation in the form of spatiotemporal self-location 
of the causal agent, the self-mover in relation to the environment. These three primary parameters of event representation, 
spatial, temporal and causal are configured in agent-centric terms, because computations designed to generate and control self-
movement in relation to the environment must necessarily be framed in terms of the perspective of said self-movement–the 
first-person or egocentric perspective of the agent. The structural parameters of the interactive event are, then, causal, spatial 
and temporal. Casting these in the perspective of the self-moving agent: the egocentric depiction of the self-moving causal 
agent (the self-mover) at every moment is “I” (or perhaps, more primitively, “this”); the egocentric representation of real 
space, actual spatial location of the agent-in-relation-to-the-environment is always “here”; and the egocentric representation 
of real time, the actual temporal location of the agent-in-relation-to-the-environment at every interactional moment is “now”. 
Collectively, these three egocentric parameters structure the self-locational reference frame, the fundamental self-locating 
interactional event schema of the cognitive system as i-here-now. The extraction of the three critical parameters from the 
continuous processing of the ongoing interactional event to form a single, self-locational schema involves a process of 
schema-abstraction operated by the cognitive system as part of the normal process of memory consolidation, whereby the 
structure of interactive events is abstracted and retained as a skeletal event-schema. (Bartlett 1932; DiSibio 1982; Alba & 
Hasher 1983; Ost & Costall 2002). Ongoing experience is subsequently assimilated and configured in terms of these abstracted 
event schemas (Minsky 1975; Neisser 1976;  Mandler 1988, 1992; Rumelhart 1980; Schank & Abelson 1977; Nelson & 
Gruendel 1981, 1986; Hudson 1986, 1997). Experienced events are constantly configured (and consistently coherent) in terms 
of the egocentric self-location of the agent (Wallentin 2008) within a spatiotemporal manifold (Grush 2000, 2005; Dainton 
2000) of subjective presence  (Metzinger 1995, 1998; Revonsuo 2006) because the configuration of events is consistently 
engineered (and constantly updated) in terms of this basic schematic spatiotemporal reference frame. Moreover, I shall argue 
that when this schematic reference frame is activated within a recursive processing architecture (see section 4 below), the self-
locational update will manifest phenomenally as the ongoing sense of consciously being-in-the-world here and now. 
Because the three structural parameters of the self-locational schema constitute the basic content of consciousness, it is 
important to clarify precisely what they represent. As the i-here-now reference frame models an ongoing dynamic relational 
process between agent and environment, a relationship rather than things or objects themselves, it cannot properly be 
considered a model of the self and the environment (Edelman 1987, 1989, 1992, 1999, 2003; Damasio 1994, 1999, 2000; 
Gibson 1987 & Neisser 1988, Churchland & Churchland 2002) or a respresentation of the self model nested in a map of the 
environment, as has also been proposed (Mountcastle 1978; Johnson-Laird 1983, 1988; James, 1890; Newton, 1991; 
Somerhoff & Macdorman, 1994:159; Delacour 1995; Metzinger 2000, 2003, 2005). Nor, certainly, does the i-here-now 
reference frame derive from a model of the world where the self is an optional ingredient (Revonsuo 2005) or utterly irrelevant 
(Yates 1975; Lehar 2003). There must needs be a source for the ”I” reference, given that the cognitive representational system 
On  this basis, path integration (self location) can be understood as a functional capacity of reptiles as it is of ma m m als. birds, 
insects, fish and crustaceans. 
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is a distal or intentional representation system which provides no intrinsic self-reference whatsoever.10 Representations, as 
Kant noted over 3 centuries ago, are always about something other than themselves (Kant 1781-1787; Bretano 1874; Husserl 
1900), and do not refer to the cognitive machinery that immediately underwrites them. But if cognition is not referring to itself 
as “I”, then whence this persistent, ubiquitous self-reference? Several lines of evidence converge to suggest that core or 
minimal self is grounded in the capacity for self-movement or “agency”, designating the self-mover as causal parameter of a 
singular but more complex representation, that of the interactional event. Firstly, as reviewed above, the basic operational 
principles of cognition reflect a system dedicated to the representation of dynamic events, not things, Objects are most 
primitively individualized and identified as motion events (Raftopoulos 2004; Carey & Xu 2001; Spelke 1990), and the self, 
consequently, should be expected to follow suit as the representation of self-motion. Specifically, the cognitive system 
constructs its representational panorama in terms of the ongoing self-movement-to-environment interactional event. The 
operational management of this interaction is made possible by its representation in terms of the spatiotemporal location of the 
self-movement in relation to the environment. This, in turn suggest that the subject of cognition–that which is located spatially 
and temporally–can be nothing other that this self-mover. 
The structure of cognition reflects a configuration based on the representation of the self as causal parameter of a self-
movement event in several ways. Firstly, “I” constitutes the central viewpoint of a spatiotemporal manifold configured in 
terms of a first-person perspective, rather than a non-centered object-oriented panorama. This egocentric configuration, as 
argued by Grush and others, is based on the capacity for and skills involved in self-movement (Grush 2000; Brewer 1992; 
Evans 1982). The basic constituents of the perceived panorama (up, down, in, out, foreground, background) have an 
orientational structure reflecting how I act (Taylor 1978-9), which implicitly defines the “I” as just this self-moving actor. 
Secondly, the self-model is necessarily related to agency because self-reference functions within a predictive forward-model-
based processing structure (see “Architecture of Consciousness” below) dedicated specifically to the predictive management 
of self-movement (Hohwy 2007). And finally, the temporal structuring of cognitive experience in terms of before, after and 
duration, along with the constant conscious tabulation of a psychological now moment (“the ‘specious present’) both reflect 
the dedication of the cognitive system to the perception of dynamic events (not static things) and management of self-
movement in particular (Gregory 1997; Dennet & Kinsbourne 1992; Georgopoulos 2002; Nobre & O’Reilley 2004; Brown & 
Rosenbaum 2002), with attendant implication that subjective center of that autoactivity will be a self construed as actor/agent. 
Psychological tests confirm the agental core of the self. In an experiment designed to ascertain the degree of accuracy of 
subjective reports about one's own movements, and to determine the type of signals used for monitoring self-generated actions, 
Georgieff & Jeannerod (1998) found that self-specification is action-related, not body related. That is, visual signals of a 
moving hand interpreted as self-movement override internal body sensations (proprioceptive/kinesthetic signals) of the 
subject’s actual stationary hand. Self-recognition is based on perceived action of hand, not mere somatic presence; subjects 
essentially ‘privilege movement-related visual information over kinesthetic information’ (J & G 1998:7) when determining 
what forms part of the self (‘mineness’ or ownership). Remembering that within the anticipative forward model processing 
10 By contrast, there is the notion that all internal representational states are inherently self­aware (Neisser 1976; Searle 1979, 1992; 
Lycan 1996:11; Damasio 1999 ). In addition to brain/mind dualism, Descartes promoted the equally unhelpful idea that ‘nothing 
mediates between  a mental state and our being conscious of it (Rosenthal 1992). Nineteenth century phenomenology refined this 
position by coopting  the ‘intentional’ or distal­referencing property of mental representations, to insist that ‘a  mental state is 
conscious by virtue of being intentionaly directed at itself’ (Kreigel 2003). The  view persists. With little in the way  of hard answers to 
the hard question,  there is the temptation, Keith Sutherland notes (2000), for scholars to simply posit consciousness as intrinsic to 
all internal representational states, with the result that Panpsychism  currently enjoys a revival (Clark 2004; Rangarajand 2008). 
However, the evidence appears clearcut that mental states are not intrinsically self­referring either in the sense of (1) refering to 
themselves as mental/physiological states, (2) of understanding themselves or (3) of automatically monitoring themselves. We  
experience the colors of a tree as of the external tree out there, not as mental paint (Harman  1997) by virtue of whch  we  
experience the tree. Moreover, we  experience the visual depiction of a tree, not the optic array on the eyeball. Self experience can 
be deceptive (experienced pain in the leg may  in fact result from a slipped disc impinging upon  the sciatic nerve in the back), and 
self­understanding faulty (Nisbett &  Wilson 1977) because  mental states have no direct introspective access to the workings of their 
own  cognitive or neural machinery. Cognition conveys information about distant causal antecedents without also carrying 
information about the proximal cognitive operators or operations carrying the information (Dretske 1981:158; cf Miller 1962; Prinz 
1992; Velmans  2000; Marcel 2003). Finally, as to the intrinsic capacity for cognitive mentation to monitor itself, we  have only to note 
that the greater part of cogntive mentation is unconscious – i.e emphatically not monitoring itself. Conscious mentation therefore, 
requires an additional cognitive operation of some  kind, which this article identifies as recursive processing (see section 4). 
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system (see section 4 for details), perception is an integral part of the self-movement production system, this is not merely 
movement-related information, but information generated by the self-movement-production system. The self, by extension, 
must be a construct representing the self-mover. 
This reliance on information generated within the action-production system for distinguishing self from nonself is dramatically 
expressed in alien hand syndrome where a functional dissociation between higher intentional (agental) and lower movement-
execution levels of the motor-control hierarchy produces an internal sense that a particular limb does not belong to the subject 
(Assal, Schwartz & Vuilleumier 2007). Schizophrenic dissociation based on lack of feedback from self-produced action result 
in the conviction that certain acts do not belong to the subject (Frith 1992). In both cases, the sense of what constitutes “me” is 
determined within the machinery of self-movement. Indeed, as Meijsing points out (2000), the ongoing sense of self in 
proprioceptively deafferented subjects lacking somatic registration of bodily presence, is maintained by self-movement.  This 
dissociation of bodily sense from self sense reflects the separation, at the neurological level of the body map of the 
somatosensory cortex  (located along the postcentral gyrus of the parietal lobe–Brodmann areas 3a, 3b, 1 and 2), from the 
medial fronto-posterior axis of self-referential cognitive processing (Northoff 2004, 2006; Kjaer, Nowak & Lou 2002; Seger, 
Stone & Keenan 2004).
While self-construct is connected most closely with agency, the converse also holds: the absence of a sense of self is also 
tightly correlated with the diminution in the capacity for self-movement. Prominent among the features of Depersonalization 
Disorder is the diminution of a sense of self underwritten by a lack of a sense of agency, of control of one’s actions, resulting 
in a common complaint that the subject feels like an automaton or robot (Sierra & Berrios 2001; Metzinger 2003:326). 
Diminution of the self-sense is accompanied by various kinds of sensory anesthesia. The loss of self forms part of a diminished 
capacity for action, self-movement. ‘It’s as if you have no self, no ego, no remnant of that inner strength which quietly and 
automatically enabled you to deal with the world around you (will, agency), and the world inside you. It may settle over time, 
into a feeling of “nothingness”, as if you were without emotions, dead’ (Steinberg & Schall 2000). In the extreme form of 
Cotard’s syndrome (the ‘Delierium of Negation’), subjects deny that they are alive, claiming their bodies are now dead 
(present but not functioning) and parts are often missing (Berrios & Luque 1995). Depersonalization then, points to a non 
somatic, agency-related basis for the minimal sense of self.  
In sum, psychological and neurological studies indicate that the self or “I” is a cognitive construct representing most 
essentially the self-mover, the agent. This self-movement capacity constitutes the third causal parameter of a singular, self-
locating representation of the ongoing interactional event, which serves to simultaneously form ongoing cognitive experience 
as a self-to-environment interactional event, and in so doing, to differentiate the self-mover from the environment, self-
movement from other-movement (Hohwy 2007; Boyer et al 2005; Legrand 2006:20).  
The ongoing enaction of every interactive moment then, takes place in terms of a common structural framework, the 
spatiotemporal self-location of the agent from a first-person perspective. The self-locational i-here-now schema is the BASIC 
INTERACTIONAL EVENT SCHEMA that underwrites the continuous cognition of daily events. As the abstracted foundational structure 
of event cognition per se, this paradigmatic schema has become part of the innate heritage of the vertebrate cognitive system in 
much the same way as the innate domain-specific learning device (Carey and Spelke 1994) and the language-acquisition 
device (Chomsky 1975). Like all image schemas11, it functions to organize ongoing phenomenal experience in terms of an 
extended spatiotemporal manifold, or more fully, in terms of a self-moving causal agent continuously located spatially and 
temporally within such a manifold. Beyond this, its significance to cognition lies in the fact that if activated within a tightly 
11 Image  schemas, like ordinary schemas, are abstract representational structures, highly schematic gestalts. Unlike ordinary 
schemas  dedicated to purveying propositional information, including information concerning the current relationship of the 
organism  with its environment (Arbib, Erdi &  Szentagothai 1998:42), image  schemas  capture the structural contours of 
sensory­motor experience in order to serve as space­time simulatiors (Oakley 2007:2). Image  schemas  have the specific 
characteristic that they are formed  through the distillation of spatial and  temporal experience (they arise from, or are grounded  
in, human  recurrent bodily move ments through space, perceptual interactions, and ways  of manipulating objects) and  
subsequently, through reactivation, organize the construal of our experience in spatiotemporal terms.  
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recursive processing architecture (see below), this self-locational schema has the potential to manifest cognitively as a form of 
subjective self-awareness. 
4. Evolution of the Architecture of Consciousness
While the self-locational i-here-now schema underwrites the distinctive self-orientating content of consciousness, it is the 
autoreferential or recursive quality (or processing style) of conscious self-awareness which constitutes what most analysts 
consider its defining characteristic. Self-referencing is not an intrinsic characteristic of mental representation (see note 10 
above), and will be explained here as the consequence of a predicitve processing architecture which developes, as a 
consequence of evolutionary pressure for greater energy efficiency, a recursively-predictive circuit for processing the self-
locational i-here-now schema. The recursive processing architecture underwriting conscious subjectivity, then, does not appear 
like a miracle de novo. It evolves from existing feedforward, and prior to that, feedback processing architectures.  
Whence a cognitive processing architecture based initially on feedback? This question relates directly to what cognitive 
systems essentially do. The preceding section provided an extensive review of evidence indicating that cognition is designed to 
guide action (Glenberg 1997; Barsalou 2002; Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak 2004; Borghi 2005). But the complete explanation 
is that cognition is essentailly designed to guide action in relation to homeostatic/emotional needs (Churchland 2002a:105; 
Basso & Olivetti Belardinelli 2006:75). Cognitive systems are to be found not in physical stuff (air, water, rocks, gas), but 
within biological organisms. This is crucial for understanding what cognition actually does, why it exists at all.  The 
fundamental challenge for all biological organisms is to maintain survival by sustaining homeostasis–the internal conditions 
supporting life–in the midst of ongoing interaction with an ever-changing, often-threatening environment (Cannon 1932; 
McMillan 2005). Cognition provides a means of extending the biological capacity to maintain homeostasis through interaction 
by extending the capacity to control the organism-to-environment interaction. This is accomplished by self-movement (Richter 
1937, 1942-3; Ashby 1960:58; Young 1964:000; Panksepp 1982:415; Cisek 1999; Damasio 1999; Bickhard 2004, 2008).  As 
noted above, almost all living organisms have found some way of responding adaptively to environmental changes through 
movement. Cognition is one movement-facilitating solution, but one that has distinct advantages, most notably the capacity to 
represent.
Cognition then, is essentially an adaptive extension of the organism’s homeostatic control system to aid ongoing survival and 
reproductive success (Anderson 2007), and self-movement serving homeostasis forms the heart of that extended self-
regulative functionality (Damasio 1999; Parvizi & Damasio 2001; Young 1964). Primitive cognitive systems then, essentially 
provide a capacity for self-movement to biological organisms that welcome any means of extending their capacity to maintain 
homeostasis. But, self-movement unconnected to ongoing metabolic needs will not suffice. A cognitive organism unable to 
relate what it is doing to what it needs for ongoing homeostatic balance will not survive – cannot survive (Rosenbleuth et al 
1943; Ashby 1960; Young 1964; Churchland 2002:76). Thus, cognition is of necessity configured most basically as a control 
system that relates ongoing action outcomes to current homeostatic needs, thereby self-regulating its homeostatic condition by 
self-movement or self-to-environment interaction.12  
12 The  fundamental idea behind self­regulative cognitive processing has been  known  since at least the time of Aristotle, and  
was  well expounded  by Herbart (1825) and  William James  (1890). It is that organisms  act so as to bring about the conditions 
they desire, or, more  primitively, the conditions they homeostatically require. They  shape  their interaction with the world in a 
self­beneficial direction by constraining their behavior toward agreement with internal perceptually­represented goals (desired 
states) rather than mere  reactivity to mo m entary external pressures (James  1890; Miller, Galanter; Pribram  1967). Ideomotor 
control of motor output then is achieved through the controlled approximation of perceptual input resulting from  motor action 
with perceptually­represented goals (Marken 1986; Bourbon  1995). SRP  means  perceptually­represented goal acting to initiate 
and  control behavior. 
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But survival and reproductive success depend not only on a self-regulatory operating regime, but on the regime’s ability to 
operate in an energy efficient manner, because motor output is energy expensive. And biological organisms can be viewed 
most basically as energy regimes (over half the body’s weight is devoted to cellular elements that manufacture energy), so that 
‘any organism that can capture prey, escape predators and achieve goals with a minimum demand on metabolic energy, has an 
evolutionary advantage’ (Neilson & Neilson 2005:283). Thus, whatever the somatic and neurological changes engineered by 
the need to meet specific environmental challenges, the challenge is always to operate with maximum energy efficiency. In the 
evolutionary kingdom, energy is the coin of the realm, as it were, and several theorists cast the critical agent-to-environment 
interaction specifically in these terms, such that phylogeneticly-emergent energy-transformation regimes interact with an 
environment-as-energy-gradient in order to sustain themselves (Jarvilehto 1998; Lotka 1945; Odum 1983; Vandervert 1995; 
Kauffman 1995).  In terms of the critical relation between action and homeostasis, cognitive systems can thus be viewed as 
managers, not simply of  ongoing homeostatic balance, but of the energy budget available to maintain that balance through 
action. Consequently the brain is in large measure devoted to reducing the risk of energy expenditure through action, and 
recursive orientational processing that requires virtally no physical action-output will become one of its most significant 
evolutionary achievements (see below).  
The evolutionary pressure for ever-greater energy-efficiency has driven elaboration at several functional levels of the 
neurocognitive system. At the molecular level, the energy cost of information transfer has been found to constitute a 
significant constraint on the number of signaling molecules and synapses used by neurons (Schreiber 2002). In terms of 
neuronal interconnectivity, it has been suggested that energetic costs could limit absolute numbers of neurons and synaptic 
connections (information channels) in the brain (Laughlin 1998; Laughlin et al. 2000). At the systemic level, it has been 
suggested, in consonance with the notion of a perceptuo-motor hierarchy first outlined by Hughlings-Jackson and his 
contemporaries (Magoun 1958; Berntson, Boysen and Cacioppo 1993; Prescott, Redgrave & Gurney 1998; Deacon 1989), that 
the evolution of the forebrain’s self-regulative management system is reflected in a hierarchy of control systems, from the 
purely homeostatic concerns of the hypothalamic diencephalon through emotional limbic and finally cognitive cortical level of 
control (Watt & Pincus 1994; Panksepp 1998:35, 70ff; LeDoux 1996; Edelman 1992:118; Damasio 1999). Within the context 
of this general notion of an evolutionary perceptuo-motor hierarchy in the forebrain, the management of self-to-environment 
interaction in terms of spatiotemporal self-location can be understood (as outlined above) as a core function and the primary 
reference frame for the ongoing cognitive level control of perceptuo-motor processing. Most significant in this regard is the 
fact that evolutionary pressures for increased energy efficiencies have encouraged not only the emergence of successive levels 
(or tiers) of control, but also the elaborative changes in the control mechanism itself, which, studies indicate, has evolved from 
feedback (Diagram 1), to feedforward (Diagram 2), and finally, within the spatiotemporal self-location (path integration) 
module, to a simplified, recursively-feedforward circuitry (Diagram 3 items ‘b’ and ‘c’). In so doing, the hierarchical 
perceptuo-motor control system is provided with an energy-saving default state of cognitive activation in its top tier which 
does not require physical motor-output for its completion. As discussed below (Self-regulative processing evolves from 
feedforward to recursively feedforward), it is this recursive processing circuit in the top tier that underwrites the state of 
consciousness.
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Feedback provides the link between homeostasis and self-movement  In the 19th century, French physiologist Claude 
Bernard highlighted the necessity of biological organisms to maintain a consistent internal physico-chemical environment (the 
milieu intérieur), which permits internal vital processes to continue functioning, independent of physicochemical perturbations 
in the external environment (Bernard 1859; Cannon 1932). Self-movement is one means to that end–adopted in some form by 
most biological organisms (Richter 1937, 1942-3). The earliest self-regulatory processing (S-R-P) mechanism that serves to 
maintain a tight relationship between behavioral motor output and internal homeostatic needs, comprises a simple negative 
feedback control mechanism (Diagram 1). 
Within such a system, behavior is no longer 
simply a kneejerk reaction to external stimuli, 
but a reaction geared to the maintenance of 
critical internal conditions. The fundamental 
S-R-P operating principle linking motor 
output to homeostatic needs is initially 
embodied within cognitive functionality in 
the form of feedback control, which acts to 
restore deviations from regulated internal set 
points through corrective external actions. In 
this way, the brain exercises control over 
homeostasis by using motor output to 
produce desired homeostasis-regulating 
inputs (Cisek 1999).   
In Diagram 1, this feedback control 
processing architecture is illustrated in terms 
of a representation of current state, which is 
compared to that of desired homeostatically-
based goal state (DS) in a comparator ', 
with the disparity driving continued motor 
output until CS more closely approximates 
DS. Simpler versions of this architecture 
(Toates 1986:37; Wagner 1999:55; Schulze 
& Mariano 2003:11-4; Manning & Dawkins 
1996:31) often omit a principled 
representation of the current state, which 
must be coherently represented in order to be compared to desired state (DS), particularly when the CS of this 
particularprocessing module is not a simple biological marker such as glucose level, but the current spatiotemporal self-
location of the agent in relation to the environment. The ongoing coherence of this Current-State-of-Spatiotemporal-
Orientation representation is maintained by the continuous structuring input from a memory buffer (Merfeld 2001; Bridgeman 
et al 1994; Neilson & Neilson 2005) containing the BASIC INTERACTIONAL EVENT SCHEMA. As explained in section 3, the self-
locational i-here-now schema, is an abstracted generalization over ongoing interactive experience which serves to organize 
ongoing phenomenal experience (Current State) in terms of an extended spatiotemporal manifold, or more fully, in terms of a 
self-moving causal agent continuously located spatially and temporally within such a manifold. The continuous activation of 
this schema configures experience as spatiotemporally-calibrated interaction betweeen agent and environment such that self-
movement can be calculated. But over time, evolutionary pressure has encouraged the exploitation of the potental 
discontinuity between orientational schema activation and the actual output of action, and consciousness is the result.  
Diagram 1: Feedback Control Circuit – Simple Feedback  
control circuit that works to align actual current sate with desired 
(homeostatic) state. LEGE N D:  CS  = Current State; DS  = Desired State;
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Due to time and energy-efficiency pressures, self-regulative processing architecture evolves from feedback to feedforward 
Cognitively endowed self-regulating biological organisms are particularly exposed to evolutionary pressures for energy efficiency 
because of the dedication of cognition to regulating homeostatic levels via energy-expensive motor output. As outlined above, 
cognition essenttially regulates homeostasis via action output. But the fact that  the cognitive system has been constituted to 
function as a continuously moving platform presents two significant problems for the maintenance of homeostasis via self-
movement: feedback processing is too slow for accurate control of a constantly-mobile cognitive organism (Churchland 2002a:82), 
and in addition, too costly in terms of the energy-expensive of corrective actions. To overcome multiple delays in sensorimotor 
feedback loops (Miall & Wolpert 1996:1269; Miall et al 1993: 205; Grush 1997:14; Jordan 2004:408), and eliminate the need for 
further corrective movements as far as possible (Basso & Olivetti Belardinelli 2006), fast motor control must necessarily be 
anticipative as far as possible, involving a combination of predictive (anticipative) feedforward models of both muscle kinematics 
and the perceptual outcome of movement (Desmurget & Grafton 2000). On the energy-expense front, physical activity of any kind 
risks depletion of scarce energy reserves with no guarantee of replenishment. As a means of minimizing this risk, the central self-
regulatory-processing (S-R-P) mechanism has evolved from a feedback mechanism that corrects for homeostatic deviations, to 
feedforward processing that operates proactively through anticipatory actions to defend internal homeostatic conditions from 
becoming deviated. 
Feedforward processing provides increased energy efficiency in several significant ways: most basically, predictive adjustment to 
ongoing motor output saves energy through improved accuracy and minimization of the motor trajectory (Morasso 1981; Wolpert 
& Flanagan 2001). Anticipation of (rather than feedback from) environmental change reduces the ultimate effect and thereby, the 
amount of compensatory adjustment required (Brosilow & Joseph 2002). In the case of anticipated danger for example, predictive 
feedforward circuitry underwrites the capacity for complete avoidance (Prescott, Redgrave & Gurney 1998:18). The capacity, in 
feedforward architecture, to represent the expected results of upcoming actions provides the basis for replacing aimless wandering 
with proactive, goal-focused foraging (Droulez and Darlot 1989; Glasauer 1992; Lewald and Ehrenstein 1998; Rao and Ballard 
1997), as well as the anticipatory orientation of attention toward stimuli which are relevant for action in general (Mehta and Schaal, 
2002). In addition, feedforward representation provides the capacity to completely replace energy-expensive external trial-and-error 
activity with internal mental planning (Tolman 1932; Craik 1943:61; Mandler 2002:107). Finally, feedforward goal representation 
supports not just trajectory minimization, but action minimization, the replacement of attack with threat (of attack), of extended 
bodily movement with gesture as the initial basis of communication. 
The net result of these avenues to improved energy efficiency is a cognitive system capable of anticipatively self-regulating for 
homeostasis by means of feedforward processing mechanisms. The universality of this anticipatory feedforward architecture is 
reflected at several levels, including sensory processing (Bruner & Postman 1949; Droulez & Darlot 1989; Glasauer 1992; 
Lewald and Ehrenstein 1998; Rao and Ballard 1997; Neisser 1976; Gregory 1980; Cotterill 2001), attention (Lavigne & Denis 
2001; Mehta and Schaal, 2002), motor control (Bhushan and Shadmehr 1999; Darlot et al. 1996; Mussa-Ivaldi 1999; Yasui & 
Young 1975; Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert and Kawato, 1998; Davidson & Wolpert 2005; Nair et al. 2003; Decety & 
Jeannerod 1995; Bickhard 2005), including  anticipatory postural adjustment for upcoming self-movement, and mental 
imagery (Jeannerod, 1994, 2001; Kosslyn and Sussman, 1994). Consequently, several theories of cognition have been 
proposed (Craik 1943; Cotterill, 1998; Hesslow, 2002; Barsalou 1999; Grush 2004), based on the notion that cognitive 
representation is essentially engaging in simulated interaction with the environment by means of internal predictive internal 
models (Pezzulo 2006)
Most significantly, as regards the central claim of the theory outlined here, the dedication of cognitive architecture to an  
anticipative feedforward processing format (for speed and energy efficiency) implies that the recursive circuitry required to  
underwrite conscious subjectivity is most likely to have evolved out of such predictive cognitive architecture. Specifically, this  
theory proposes that evolutionary pressures for ever more energy-efficient sensory-motor processing has encouraged the  
progressive attenuation of feedforward processing circuitry into a simplified recursive feedforward circuit capable of  
underwriting autoreferential conscious self-awareness. 
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Diagram 2: Feedforward FM to CS with Self­Cueing Event Schema for 
greater energy efficiency via improved accuracy of movement trajectory. The INVERSE 
CONTROLLER takes as input the current state (CS) of a system as compared to the desired state  
(DS) and produces as output the action required to eliminate disparity (outer loop), as well as 
corollary output consisting of a motor command which is then further transformed into 
prediction as to the next perceptual state (FM) of the system (inner loop). FORWARD MODEL takes 
as input       SC + IC motor command copy. CURRENT STATE takes as input EVENT SCHEMA 
parameters, the FORWARD MODEL of upcomiong self-movement, and external sensory feedback 
from self-movement. The DESIRED STATE takes as input homeostatic needs. (Adapted from Miall  
The architecture customarily used to model predictive feedforward processing casts the perceptuo-motor control system as a 
Markov processor whereby the current states of a process lead to its own future states when current motor commands exert their 
effect. These future states, in turn, update the current state (Grush 2004:2.1). Markov process models explain the mechanical 
operations involved in guiding the transition of present state into the next present state. These anticipatory processing mechanisms 
use predictive or “forward” perceptual models of what the future state will be (if we go ahead and execute this action) as a way of 
guiding the transition from present moment 
to next present moment. Specifically, 
anticipatory S-R-P architecture (as illustrated 
in Diagram 2) utilizes four internal models to 
represent the various elements of the 
predictive Markhov control system: models 
for the desired state (DS), the actual current 
state (CS), the predicted future state (forward 
model FM) and a structuring schema to form 
both CS and FM into a consistent event 
representation–the BASIC INTERACTIONAL EVENT 
SCHEMA (Event Schema) abstracted from the 
ongoing agent-to-environment interaction (as 
explained in section 3). 
Within the feedforward control circuit (as 
with negative feedback loop), the desired 
homeostatic state (DS) is constantly 
compared (') with the actual current state 
(CS), and actions are generated on the basis 
of the difference between the two. But 
action generation necessary to close the gap 
between DS and CS is not random trial and 
error. The system makes use of an Inverse  
Controller (or inverse model) to provide 
motor commands specifically tailored to 
achieve a desired sensory outcome state. The capacity to match motor command with sensory representations has been 
confirmed by the recent discovery of “mirror neurons” (Rizzolatti et al 1996; Gallese et al 1996) in the prefrontal cortex which 
enable the subject to mimic actions performed by another, indicates that neural systems have the capacity to translate sensory 
input (viewed behavior) into specific kinds of motor output (a copy of the action viewed). When connected to a memory 
system that stores sensory-input to motor-output conjunctions, the brain is capable of retrieving motor output likely to produce 
required sensory inputs (Held 1968; Gyr 1972). This kind of sensory-motor memory module–an Inverse Controller–is capable 
of taking as input a perceptual representation of the required adjustment and producing as output the motor movement that will 
result in perceptual feedback incorporating that adjustment so that Current State (CS) becomes more closely aligned with 
Desired State (DS). The Inverse Controller, in other words, translates the desired perceptually-represented goal of a movement 
into the set of actions (a motor command) needed to achieve that movement (Atkeson 1989; Ghahramani & Wolpert 1997; 
Wolpert & Kawato1998; Neilson & Neilson 2005). 
The Inverse Controller also produces a copy of its motor command (corollary discharge, efference copy) which underwrites a 
predictive or “forward” model (FM) of the expected perceptual result of that action. The forward model, in other words, uses 
efference copy of the motor command to predict the sensory consequences of those commands whenever movements are made 
(Wolpert et al. 1995; Miall & Wolpert 1996; Wolpert 1997; Wolpert & Ghahramani 2000; Wolpert et al. 2001; Blakemore, 
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Wolpert & Frith 2002). The forward model is able to feed into a DS comparator (') and anticipatively adjust ongoing action; 
at the same time, the forward model predictivly updates CS in advance of feedback from actual motor output. There are thus 
three processing loops in this system: two fast internal feedforward loops from Inverse Controller to Forward Model which 
then (1) updates Current State as well as (2) feeding forward into a DS comparator to effect correction to motor output on the 
run. A third time-delayed loop (3) proceeds from the Inverse Comparator to motor output and feeds back to CS via the sensory 
systems. 
The CURRENT STATE ESTIMATE (CS) is the central representation in this control system because it is the end result that is being 
controlled for (or more correctly, its proximity to DS is being controlled for). CURRENT STATE is constituted by three inputs: (1) 
continuous feedforward updating from the Forward Model; (2) periodic feedback from the sensory systems (as gated by 
expected feedback represented by the FM); and finally (3), CS is consistently structured as the representation of an interaction 
event by the structuring input from a memory buffer (Merfeld 2001; Bridgeman et al 1994; Neilson & Neilson 2005) 
consisting of the BASIC INTERACTIONAL SCHEMA (Event Schema [ES]). Based on brain imaging studies consistently identifying the 
posteromedial cortex as the neural source for conscious cognition (Fiset et al 1999, Laureys 2004; Cavanna 2007), and the 
direct innervation of this area by the wake/sleep arousal system sourced from the postero-lateral hypothalamus via the basal 
forebrain (Saper, Scammell & Lu 2005; Jones 1998; McGinty & Szymusiak 2003), it is postulated that this structure-providing 
EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer is independently activated by the sleep/wake innervation system, thus providing a self-activating 
base to the interactional configuration of waking experience. The ES-CS feed can be envisioned as a kind of self-activated 
working memory circuit. 
The functional independence, as it were, of the EVENT SCHEMA feed is of particular importance, given that CS is a computation of 
spatiotemporal self-location updated moment to moment from self-movement feedback (as well as anticipatory FM of 
expected feedback). Without the initial structural input from the EVENT SCHEMA feed, CS would be utterly dependent on 
continuous movement for its activation. As the primary reference frame of the cognitive system, this would, in effect, hold the 
entire cognitive economy hostage to ongoing movement, both large limb ambulatory movement and tonic postural adjustment. 
The EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer is relatively independent of sensory feedback for its activation, and as a result of continuous 
evolutionary pressure to reduce energy-expensive physical activity to a minimum, it is encouraged to become more so, to 
sustain its activity through self cueing. Self-activation of ES accounts for the twin facts that (a) orientative self-locating spatial 
updating is automatic & continuous (Farrell 1998; Wang 2003; Rieke 2007), and (b) that self-location is still operative in 
deafferented individuals where there is no active sensory feedback from self movement (Meijsing 2000). Additional evidence 
for the independent self-activation of ES can be gleaned from phenomena such as change blindness (Grimes 1996), which 
indicates that the cognitive system does not depend on external feedback to maintain a consistently activated, self-located 
perceptual state. The driver for this continuity must be top-down, originating in its self-activated structural matrix, the BASIC 
INTERACTIONAL EVENT SCHEMA. 
In sum, evolutionary energy-efficiency pressures on a cognitive system built initially for the generation of self-movement for 
active regulation of homeostasis, have encouraged the development of feedforward (top-down) processing architecture that 
can maintain orientative cognition even when the organism is more or less stationary (such as during periods of rest, vigilance 
as well as immobile ambush hunting or predator avoidance immobility) such as to constitute a base state of alert action 
readiness for the timely resumption of appropriate action (predation, avoidance of predation etc). The significance of the 
connectivity involved in this feedforward processing architecture is that under evolutionary pressure to achieve further energy 
efficiencies, the processing circuit can be minimized and the connectivity simplified to the point that feedforward processing 
functions as a single recursively feedforward circuit capable of underwriting subjectivity. 
Self-regulative processing evolves from feedforward to recursively feedforward  As noted in our initial treatment of the 
explanadum, it is the phenomenal properties of conscious self-awareness that need to be explained, and primary amongst 
these, the self-referring or recursive quality of subjective self-awareness, which underwrites the feelings and sensations of 
qualia. Several existing explanations of phenomenal subjectivity refer to psychological processing mechanisms which are not, 
in themselves, recursive in nature, such as Daniel Dennett’s multiple drafts (a series of static updates), or secondary processing 
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theories such as higher-order thought (Rosenthal 1997; Dretske 1993) and higher-order perception (Armstrong 1981; Lycan 
1990), attentional highlighting of representational content (Crick 1984, Damasio 1989; Harth 1993; Hobson 1994; Mandler 
1975; Näätänen 1992; Neiser 1976; Velmans 1991), synesthetic multimodal representation (John 1976; Geschwind 1970; Hunt 
1995; Jerison 1973), linguistic coding (Edelman 1989, Creutzfeldt 1979; Luria 1978; Olds 1992; Skinner 1974) or global 
accessibility (Dennett 1978, 2001; Baars 1988), where additional processing of a perceptual representation somehow confers 
qualia-like status upon it. But in each case, the process doing the consciousness-conferring does not employ autoreferential 
processing circuitry and is not itself self-consciously aware. A more credible candidate for the generation of autoreferential 
self-awareness (consciousness) would be a self-referring cognitive mechanism, a processing circuit which is itself recursive, 
continuously feeding back upon or ‘referring to’ or ‘recognizing’ itself. This is the solution proposed here. In a nutshell, 
everything currently known about he evolution of cognition points to a consistent increase in attenuated processing of existing 
circuitry as a more energy-efficient way of maintaining homeostatic self-regulation through self-movement. Attenuation of 
feedforward circuitry (Diagram 2) leads to fully recursive feedforward circuitry (Diagram 3).
Attentuation plays a major role in the metamorphosis of the self-locational updating module from a merely anticipatory 
feedforward mechanism to a recursively-feedforward processor. For cognitive organisms, where cognition is essentially 
designed to maintain homeostasis through self-movement, the drive toward improved energy efficiency necessarily involves 
both brain and body operating efficiencies. In both instances, attenuation constitutes a common theme. When somatically 
active, all movements are constructed on a minimum-trajectory basis which is managed by last-minute, only-as-much-as 
needed adjustments (Todorov & Jordan 2002; Todorov 2004). Periods of behavioral torpor (sleep, hibernation) can be seen as 
a way of limiting active self-to-environment interaction to only the most energy-rewarding periods. Proactive foraging that 
deploys top-down feedforward circuitry to focus activity on specific targets is, again, a form of attenuated activity . And the 
development of communication from bodily gesture can also be seen as embodying this tendency toward attenuated somatic 
activation. Undoubtedly, the most extreme form of behavioral attenuation is exibited in surviving species of primitive tunicates 
which abandon both somatic (tail, tail musculature) and cognitive (brain, nervous system) capacity for motility altogether. 
Surviving forms develop a gut, gills and brachial structures which are present but no longer operative (Llinas 2001:17), 
indicating that these creatures have regressed from what was once a more actively-motile life, to a highly-attenuated 1-day 
excursion to find a suitable substrate to attach itself before resuming a permanently sessile existence. 
Attenuation is particularly critical for cognitive processing, because the brain, unlike the body, expends most of its energy on 
active informationm processing, not metabolism. Where the soma devotes 70% of its energy budget to ongoing metabolism 
and the balance to behavioral activity (posture, locomotion, mating), cognitive costs are the reverse. The brain expends 80% of 
its energy on information processing as opposed to purely metabolic  activity (Raichle & Gusnard 2002; Attwell & Laughlin 
2001). Thus, the achievement of energy economies in the way information is processed have a significant impact on the 
overall energy expenditure (Attwell & Laughlin 2001) and the cognitive economy, as a result, is replete with cost effective 
information-processing mechanisms such as sparse coding (Churchland, Ramachandran & Sejnowski 1994; Irwin & Andrews 
1996) and minimal updating of scene (Rensink, 2000; Noë, Pessoa & Thompson 2000), schema abstraction for memory 
storage (Hess & Flannagan 1992; Taylor & Crocker 1981), and attentional limitation (Mack & Rock 1998). Attenuation of the 
feedforward processing architecture leeds to the development of recursive processing circuitry. 
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Understood in terms of the ongoing interactive event, which consists of an initial self-locational calibration (i-here-now) 
followed by action output, attenuation proceeds on two fronts: (a) an extension of the initial orientative phase of interactional 
processing while minimizing the subsequent physical action component; and (b) the development an extremely truncated 
feedforward processing circuit within the orientational phase itself, facilitated by decreasing dependence on feedback from 
self-movement as major driver of the circuitry, and an increased capacity to complete its feedforward processing loop 
internally. This attenuated circuitry consists eventually, of the orientational schema feeding forward immediately into itself, 
independent of additional representational feedback from self-movement. This recursive self-conversation, as it were, 
constitutes the rudiments of subjectivity, so that the recursive processing underwriting conscious subjectivity emerges, in 
effect, from the increased evolutionary fitness derived from exchanging energy expensive physical activity for low-cost pre-
physical orientative processing. Thus, the primary (but certainly not the sole) adaptive value of recursive conscious processing 
is energy efficiency. 
Diagram 3 illustrates the specifics of this evolutionary development from feedforward to recursively feeedforward processing 
circuitry. Here, SL CURRENT STATE constitutes the final representative product of the self-locational feedforward processing 
architecture. It is normally understood that continuous spatiotemporal updating involved in this process is driven largely by 
external sensory and internal proprioceptive feedback from self-movement. But while spatiotemporal self-location constitutes 
the primary orientational reference frame on the basis of which motor output can be calculated (distance from “here” to there), 
it is also the case that the perceptuomotor-control system consists of a hierarchy of these kinds of feedforward calculations 
(Brooks 1986; Prescott, Redgrave & Gurney 1998). Thus it is possible for the top tier of the processing circuitry to evolve 
away from absolute dependence on feedback from physical self-movement without the entire motor control hierarchy grinding 
to a halt. Evolution encourages development in this direction because it produces cognitive circuitry that can remain activated 
without reliance on actual energy-expensive physical movement. Organisms than can remain cognitively alert while minimally 
active at the physical level have increased fitness. 
Increased reliance of the self-locational processor on internal drivers for continuous activation begins, as we have noted above, 
with the self-cueing EVENT SCHEMA that provides the basic structure of first the CS and eventually both CS and FM 
representations. Continued evolutionary pressure for increased energy efficiency then, encourages further development in the 
familiar form of attennuated processing. In the particular case of self-locational updating, this consists of decreased reliance on 
feedback from external physical self-movement (shown in Diagram 3 as a change from heavy to light connectivity in the 
external loop) along with increased emphasis on the internal processing circuit comprised of the reciprocal CS-FM circuit. 
Decreased external feedback means that both CS and FM can be envisaged as consisting to an ever-greater extent of the 
structural input from the EVENT SCHEMA memory buffer. As it does so, the CS-FM circuit is able to become ever more tightly 
interlocked because more completely based on its own arousal feed for self-activation, and less dependent upon the DS 
comparators as drivers. Essentially, this enables the self-locational calculation to complete its cycle within the CS-FM circuit 
alone. CS drives FM, and FM drives CS where each, eventually consists solely of the 3-parameter EVENT SCHEMA. 
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This highly attenuated positive feedback loop is now completely recursive, and driven by a self-activating memory buffer 
which is directly linked to the wake-sleep cycle of its principal arousal feed sourced in the lateral hypothalamus.  The 
recursively-processed content consists essentially of the same EVENT SCHEMA represented as current i-here-now state (CS) and 
the expected next current i-here-now state (FM).13 The CS-FM circuit has emerged as a stand-alone recursive working memory 
loop or reverberatory circuit consisting of the i-here-now Event Schema referrring continuously back upon itself. Because it is 
self-activating and thus tonically sustainable as well as supremely energy efficient,14 this new form of self-locational alertness 
13
 The  idea that consciousness consists of the merger of the immediate present with the immediate future can also be found in the 
explanation of the phenomenal present mo ment as a blend of past, present and future. Natika Newton  and Ralph Ellis contend that 
the ‘temporal thickness’ of conscious awareness derives from  a weaving together of new  sensory input with the me mory  of 
immediate past input, along with anticipations (expectations) of immediate future input. (Newton 2001; cf. Ellis &  Newton  1998:425).
14 Consciousness provides an extemely energy­efficient form of cognitive activation by (1) restricting activation to the orientative 
phase  and  eliminating the energy­expensive physical output phase  of interaction; (2) minimizing cognitive orientative activation 
to a single schema, which (3) underwrites sparse coding of self­in­environment representation. Having emerged  under the 
aegis of evolution’s demand  for energy efficientcy, consciousness solidifies its postion by underwriting two further benefits of 
critical importance: (4) the self­sustaining recursive circuitry underwrites an additional forward model loop for offline future 
planning of ways  to achieve goals; and  (5) the circuitry also underwrites the capacity to imaginatively determine the desired 
goal state (DS) itself independent of short­term homeostatic needs. This independence  provides for a fully proactive approach 
to life and the energy savings which accrue to maximal use of long­term goal decisions and  forward planning. Incorporating 
these energy­saving benefits, consciousness becomes  entrenched within the cogntive system, underwriting as it does a 
significant portion of cognition’s ticket to ride – it’s evolutionary fitness. With so many  advantages, and with cognition­as­motor­
output manage ment under such pressure to economize, the rudimentary beginnings of recursive orientational schema  
processing undoubtedly begin sooner in the evolutionary timescale than currently assumed.  
 Diagram 3: Panel A  is essentailly the same  as in the previous diagram. Panel B  shows  the circuit consisting of DS  Ô comparators Ô 
Inverse Controller diminishing in importance, and the CS­FM  reciprocal connectivity strengthening. Also, the i­here­now Event Schema  
constitutes an ever­greater proportion of both CS  and  FM. In Panel C, SC  and FM  essentially feed forward nto each other, constituting a 
self­activated, recursive, working me mory  circuit. 
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becomes the default processing state of active cognition; a default state of recursive i–here-now schema processing which 
manifests at the phenomenal level as subjectivity, conscious self-awareness.
Consciousness, therefore, can be considered the by-product of incessant evolutionary pressure on cognitive organisms for 
greater energy efficiency, pressure that has driven the existing self-regulatory FC architecture toward greater attenuation via a 
more tightly recursive format involving the CS-FM-CS working memory loop such that the orientational schema phasing 
between an immediate present (CS) and immediate future (FM) as itself, is simultaneously anticipating and recognizing itself, 
or tonically monitoring itself in the form of i-here-now. 
In terms of Nagel’s sense of subjectivity wherein there is always “something it is like to be that organism, something for that 
organism (Nagel 1974:436); that “something it is like to be” is everywhere and always primarily what it is like for that 
organism to be an i-here-now.  The recursive i-here-now is always what subjectivity is like. As outlined in the first section of 
this proposal, subjectivity consists in experiencing oneself as here and now at every moment in every circumstance. This being 
oneself here and now has an immediacy which encompasses both agency (I am performing this act) and ownership (this object  
is part of me) such that before initiating any intellectual operations or discursive thought, and independent of them, I am 
already “directly” acquainted with the contents of my self-consciousness. Self recognition entails self-discernment: I always 
know which one is me, which one I am. I am never unfamiliar with myself, never surprised by my presence. I experience 
myself as being identical through time; I experience my leg subjectively as always having belonged to me; I always experience 
my thoughts, my focal attention, and my emotions as part of my own consciousness; voluntary acts are initiated by myself.
At the phenomenal level, conscious self-awareness arises as a singular unified field of self-awareness because underwritten by 
a single schema, processed continuously in an autoreferential or recursive style where “self” is always experienced, 
subjectively, as an “I” explicitly located “here” and “now”. This recursive i-here-now processing provides the basis of 
subjective self-awareness, of what it feels like to be oneself here and now. This is consciousness.
 
5. Conclusion  
Consciousness bears the self-locational content that it does because orientation grounds the behavioral output of any self-
moving cognitive platform. Framed in the egocentric perspective of that self-moving platform, the structural parameters 
(spatial, temporal and causal) of the ongoing, constantly-updated orientational event are abstracted  and fused into a single 
schema, the activation of which provides the basic reference frame for ongoing cognitive experience.  Consciousness 
manifests as a unified singularity because it is the recursive processing of this single self-same schema (Mandler 2002:45). 
Consciousness is thus a process not a substance (contra Descartes 1644). The autoreferential character of conscious cognition 
derives from the recursive style in which the self-locating orientational schema is processed, tightly self-referring circuitry 
which derives from attenuative evolution of feedforward architecture into recursively feedforward processing regime. 
How does this explanation relate to the question of consciousness as generally posed in terms of the core phenomena of 
subjectivity and qualia in relation to the electromagnetic activity of the brain’s neurological processing – How does  matter  
become imagination (Edelman & Tononi 2000; cf., Anderson 2007; Koch 2004:1-2).
There would appear to be two distinct questions here: (1) How does the physics of electromagnetic activity generated in the 
brain come to comprise cognitive representation as such? And (2), how does a particular stream of cognitive representation 
become conscious self-referring (and thus subjective, qualia-like) representation (cf., Damasio 1999: 9, 170)? In the foregoing, 
we have attempted to provide an empirically-based explanation to the second of these questions in terms of the evolution of the 
primary spatiotemporal self-locational reference frame into an independently driven, continuously self-anticipating and 
thereby self-recognizing, inherently subjective state of self-awareness as i-here-now.
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